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ABSTRACT 
  The rules that should govern political campaign intervention by 
social welfare organizations exempt from taxation under § 501(c)(4) 
of the Internal Revenue Code have been the subject of recent 
controversy. Long before all the attention, a group of dedicated and 
experienced experts on the topic, under the auspices of two well-
known nonprofit groups, undertook the task of clarifying the rules 
regarding tax-exempt political activity. In light of the issues becoming 
national news, the group, known as the Bright Lines Project, also 
converted the regulatory proposal into legislative language. These two 
versions of the same rules—as a set of regulations and as a set of 
statutes—provide a natural laboratory to compare the administrative 
law implications of choosing between legislation and regulation to 
establish a set of tax rules. This Article undertakes that examination. It 
concludes that, if revenue rulings interpreting regulations are afforded 
deference under Auer v. Robbins and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & 
Sand Co., promulgating the initial definition of political campaign 
intervention as a set of regulations may well give the Internal Revenue 
Service greater power to police political campaign intervention by 
exempt organizations than would the enactment of detailed 
legislation. It recommends, however, that broad statutory guidance, 
followed by regulations, and then by revenue rulings strike the best 
balance between democratic concerns and administrative flexibility. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On May 10, 2013, at a session of the American Bar Association 
Tax Section meeting in Washington, D.C., Lois Lerner, then the 
director of the Exempt Organization Division of the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS, or Service), apologized for IRS mishandling of 
applications by Tea Party groups for exemption as social welfare 
groups under § 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.).1 A 
few days later, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) Inspector 
General released a report concluding that the “IRS used 
inappropriate criteria that identified for review Tea Party and other 
organizations applying for tax-exempt status based upon their names 
or policy positions instead of indications of potential political 
campaign intervention.”2 
A storm of controversy followed, with Republicans leading the 
charge.3 During the course of the controversy, those who saw the IRS 
efforts as inept rather than malicious repeatedly pointed out the 
difficulty the IRS faced in applying ambiguous regulations to 
 
 1. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2012); Fred Stokeld, IRS Sparks Outrage with Admission It 
Mistreated Tea Party Groups, TAX NOTES TODAY, May 13, 2013, available at LEXIS, 2013 TNT 
92-3.  
 2. INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., DEP’T OF TREASURY, 2013-10-053, 
INAPPROPRIATE CRITERIA WERE USED TO IDENTIFY TAX-EXEMPT APPLICATIONS FOR 
REVIEW (2013), available at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2013reports/201310053fr.
pdf.  
 3. See Memorandum from Majority Staff, Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, to 
Members, Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, Interim Update on the Committee’s 
Investigation of the Internal Revenue Service’s Inappropriate Treatment of Certain Tax-
Exempt Applicants (Sept. 17, 2013), available at http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2013/09/2013-09-17-Interim-update-on-IRS-Investigation-of-tax-exempt-applicants.pdf. 
For a discussion of five other hearings held by various House and Senate committees, see Josh 
Hicks, Five and Counting: Yet Another IRS Hearing, WASH. POST FED. EYE BLOG (June 4, 
2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2013/06/04/five-and-
counting-yet-another-irs-hearing. 
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applications for exemption.4 Under the language of I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) 
organizations must be operated “exclusively for the promotion of 
social welfare.”5 Treasury Regulations § 1.501(c)(4)–1, however, 
states, “An organization is operated exclusively for the promotion of 
social welfare if it is primarily engaged in promoting in some way the 
common good and general welfare of the people of the community.”6 
The regulations further specify that “promotion of social welfare does 
not include direct or indirect participation or intervention in political 
campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public 
office”7—that is, political campaign intervention. Nowhere, however, 
has the IRS ever defined what constitutes primary activity, and some 
practitioners argue that 49 percent of a § 501(c)(4) organization’s 
activities can consist of political intervention.8 
 
 4. See, e.g., ERIKA K. LUNDER & L. PAIGE WHITAKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R40183, 501(C)(4)S AND CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY: ANALYSIS UNDER TAX AND CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE LAWS 5–6 (2013), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40183.pdf; NAT’L 
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: 
POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND THE RIGHTS OF APPLICANTS FOR TAX-EXEMPT STATUS 14–15 
(2013), available at http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/userfiles/file/FullReport/Special-
Report.pdf; DANIEL WERFEL, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., CHARTING A PATH FORWARD AT 
THE IRS: INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND PLAN OF ACTION 28 (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/
pub/newsroom/Initial%20Assessment%20and%20Plan%20of%20Action.pdf; Conflicting Laws, 
Ambiguous Language Help Fuel IRS Confusion, CBS DC (June 5, 2013, 8:23 AM), 
http://washington.cbslocal.com/2013/06/05/conflicting-laws-ambiguous-language-help-fuel-irs-
confusion; Brendan Fischer, Ambiguity in Tax Rules and Disintegration of Election Law May 
Have Led to IRS Tea Party Mess, PR WATCH (May 15, 2013), http://www.prwatch.org/news/
2013/05/12109/ambiguity-tax-rules-and-disintegration-election-law-may-have-led-irs-tea-party-
me. 
 5. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)(A). 
 6. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)–1(a)(2)(i) (as amended in 1990) (emphasis added); see also 
Ellen P. Aprill, The IRS’s Tea Party Tax Row: How ‘Exclusively’ Became ‘Primarily,’ PAC. 
STANDARD (June 7, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.psmag.com/politics/the-irss-tea-party-tax-row-
how-exclusively-became-primarily-59451 (noting the seeming conflict between the language of 
the statute and the regulation, but recognizing that “problems regarding excessive campaign 
intervention by these kinds of organizations will not be solved, at a penstroke [sic], by simply 
returning to the statutory requirement” of exclusivity). 
 7. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)–1(a)(2)(ii).  
 8. See, e.g., SECTION OF TAXATION, AM. BAR ASS’N, COMMENTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL 
MEMBERS OF THE EXEMPT ORGANIZATION COMMITTEE’S TASK FORCE ON SECTION 501(C)(4) 
AND POLITICS (2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/tax/
pubpolicy/2004/040525exo.authcheckdam.pdf; Ellen P. Aprill, Regulating the Political Speech of 
Noncharitable Exempt Organizations After Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 363, 381 (2011); Lily 
Kahng, The IRS Tea Party Controversy and Administrative Discretion, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 
ONLINE 41, 45 (2013), http://cornelllawreview.org/files/2013/09/99CLRO411.pdf. See generally 
Miriam Galston, Vision Service Plan v. U.S.: Implications for Campaign Activities of 501(c)(4)s, 
53 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 165 (2006). 
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Quantifying the permissible amount of political campaign 
intervention for § 501(c)(4) organizations, however, will not be 
sufficient to resolve the current problems regarding classification of 
§ 501(c)(4) organizations. Exempt organizations and their advisors 
also need to know what constitutes political campaign intervention 
before they can know how much of it there is or should be.9 As the 
Bright Lines Project (BLP)—the focus of this Article—has explained, 
“[I]t has become apparent that a major factor in this systematic 
breakdown of the review process is the lack of clear, neutral, 
objective standards by which IRS employees and managers could 
determine whether applicants were engaged in political 
intervention.”10 Similarly, a 2013 IRS report stated, “One of the 
significant challenges . . . has been the lack of a clear and concise 
definition of ‘political campaign intervention.’”11 
Currently, the IRS uses the same criteria to define political 
campaign intervention by § 501(c)(4) organizations, which are 
permitted to engage in some uncertain quantity of political campaign 
intervention, as it does in the context of § 501(c)(3) charitable 
organizations, which are prohibited from any political campaign 
intervention.12 Revenue Ruling 2007-41, the most recent and 
 
 9. The IRS and Treasury included “[g]uidance under §501(c)(4) relating to measurement 
of an organization’s primary activity and whether it is operated primarily for the promotion of 
social welfare, including guidance relating to political campaign intervention” in their first-
quarter update, see MARK J. MAZUR, DANIEL I. WERFEL & WILLIAM J. WILKINS, DEP’T OF 
TREASURY, FIRST QUARTER UPDATE TO THE 2013–2014 PRIORITY GUIDANCE PLAN (2013), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2013-2014_pgp_1st_quarter_update.pdf, as well as in 
the 2013–2014 Priority Guidance Plan, see MARK J. MAZUR, DANIEL I. WERFEL & WILLIAM J. 
WILKINS, DEP’T OF TREASURY, 2013–2014 PRIORITY GUIDANCE PLAN (2013), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2013-2014_pgp.pdf. However, when proposed regulations relating 
to § 501(c)(4), discussed in Part III, were released in late November 2013, they did not make a 
proposal regarding the definition of “primary activity,” but simply asked for comments on the 
issue. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)–1(a)(2), 78 Fed. Reg. 71,535, 71,537–38 (Nov. 29, 
2013). Instead, as a first step, the guidance proposed a definition of candidate-related political 
activities for § 501(c)(4) organizations. See id. at 71,538–40. The notice of proposed rulemaking 
(NPRM) asked for comments on the meaning of primary activity. Id. at 71,537–38. 
 10. Regulatory Solutions, BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, http://www.brightlinesproject.org/
summary (last visited Jan. 28, 2014).  
 11. WERFEL, supra note 4, at 20. 
 12. See Aprill, supra note 8, at 391. At the end of November 2013, the IRS and Treasury issued 
proposed regulations defining candidate-related activity for § 501(c)(4) organizations. See supra note 
9. The NPRM asked whether similar regulations should be adopted for § 501(c)(5) and § 501(c)(6) 
and perhaps even § 501(c)(3) organizations, although the NPRM stated that, because political 
campaign intervention is absolutely prohibited for § 501(c)(3) organizations, “a more nuanced 
consideration of the totality of facts and circumstances may be appropriate in that context.” Prop. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)–1(a)(2), 78 Fed. Reg. at 71,537.  
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comprehensive official IRS pronouncement on the subject, explains 
that “[w]hether an organization is participating or intervening, 
directly or indirectly, in any political campaign on behalf of or in 
opposition to any candidate for public office depends upon all of the 
facts and circumstances of each case.”13 As I have written elsewhere, 
IRS reliance—in these and other revenue rulings—on facts and 
circumstances “reaches broadly, gives discretion to the 
administrators, and leaves many organizations and their advisors with 
little certainty on how to conduct their activities day to day.”14 A 
number of commentators, including myself, have called for the IRS 
and Treasury to promulgate clear rules as to what constitutes political 
campaign intervention.15 
A dedicated group of experienced, well-known, and respected 
experts on exempt organizations has taken it upon itself to 
accomplish this task, calling its efforts the BLP. This group has 
operated under the chairmanship of Gregory Colvin of Adler & 
Colvin in San Francisco, and the vice chairmanship of Elizabeth 
Kingsley of Harmon, Curran, Spielberg, & Eisenberg in Washington, 
D.C.16 The group developed its proposals under the sponsorship of 
two well-known nonprofit organizations. Starting in 2008, the group 
worked under the auspices of OMB Watch (now the Center for 
 
 13. Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421. Issuance of the revenue ruling followed issuance 
of an IRS fact sheet which included similar but not identical examples, but which did not 
represent official guidance or advice of the national IRS office and thus was not a document on 
which taxpayers could rely as authority. See Fred Stokeld, IRS Issues Guidance on Charities and 
Politics as Election Year Looms, TAX NOTES TODAY, June 8, 2007, available at LEXIS, 2007 
TNT 111-4 (compiling comments of exempt-organization specialists comparing the fact sheet to 
the revenue ruling). 
 14. Aprill, supra note 8, at 386.  
 15. See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, Why the IRS Should Want To Develop Rules Regarding Charities 
and Politics, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643, 668–69 (2012); James Bopp, Jr. & Zachary S. Kester, 
Holding the Service’s Feet to the Fire: Applying Citizens United and the First Amendment to the 
IRC § 501(c)(3) Political Prohibition, ENGAGE, Dec. 2010, at 75, 77; Kay Guinane, Wanted: A 
Bright-Line Test Defining Prohibited Intervention in Elections by 501(c)(3) Organizations, 5 
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 142, 143 (2007); Elizabeth Kingsley, Bright Lines? Safe Harbors?, 20 
TAX’N EXEMPTS, July/Aug. 2008, at 38, 42. 
 16. See Staff and Drafting Committee, BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, http://www.
brightlinesproject.org/blp-team (last visited Jan. 30, 2014). Other members of the drafting 
committee are Eve Borenstein, Borenstein and McVeigh; Terence Dougherty, American Civil 
Liberties Union; Rosemary Fei, Adler & Colvin; James Joseph, Arnold & Porter; Abby Levine, 
Alliance for Justice; John Pomeranz, Harmon, Curran, Spielberg + Eisenberg; and Ezra Reese, 
Perkins Coie. Id. 
APRILL FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2014  9:08 AM 
1640 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:1635 
Effective Government); since November 2012, it has been housed at 
Public Citizen.17 
The BLP’s effort began “many years ago with the assumption 
that the project should focus on encouraging the IRS to modify its 
regulations regarding tax exempt political activity so that the rules are 
clearer.”18 Recently, however, in “light of the tax exemption 
determination process becoming national news” and attracting 
congressional attention, “leaders in the [BLP] have worked to convert 
the regulatory proposal developed over four years into legislative 
language” as a possible alternative.19 The BLP describes its proposed 
§ 4956 on political campaign intervention as tracking its regulatory 
proposal.20 
Participants in the BLP have been discussing its suggestions with 
both tax administrators and legislators.21 Recently, a number of other 
nonprofit groups have endorsed its efforts, including, perhaps most 
importantly, Independent Sector,22 which is a coalition of some six 
hundred nonprofit organizations that describes itself as “the 
leadership network for nonprofits, foundations, and corporate giving 
programs committed to advancing the common good in America and 
around the world.”23 Other well-known groups that have endorsed the 
BLP include the Brennan Center for Justice, the Center for 
Responsive Politics, and the Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in 
Washington.24 
 
 17. See About Us, BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, http://www.brightlinesproject.org/about-us 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2014). Public Citizen has a four-decades-long history of successfully 
influencing public policy. See About Us, PUB. CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=
2306 (last visited Jan. 30, 2014).  
 18. Regulatory Solutions, supra note 10. 
 19. Legislative Solutions, BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, http://www.brightlinesproject.org/
legislative-solutions (last visited Jan. 19, 2014). 
 20. Id. The legislative proposal also makes modifications to § 527, the provision governing 
political organization, in order to make it “easier for tax-exempt groups that may engage in too 
much political activity to move those activities to a 527 organization.” Id. While amending § 527 
would be an important and useful legislative change, this Article will not discuss it further 
because it does not have a parallel regulatory proposal. Bringing consistency to § 501(c) and 
§ 527, however, would be an important advantage of the legislative proposal. See Aprill, supra 
note 8, at 392. 
 21. See Email from Tom Halloran, Project Coordinator, Bright Lines Project, to author 
(Oct. 3, 2013, 9:39 AM) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 22. BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, http://www.brightlinesproject.org (last visited Jan. 30, 2014).  
 23. About Us, INDEP. SECTOR, http://www.independentsector.org/about#sthash.xKIcWwdJ.
dpbs (last visited Jan. 30, 2014). 
 24. See BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, supra note 22. 
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A number of commentators active in the nonprofit community 
have raised questions about aspects of the BLP.25 Consideration of 
particular criticisms, however, is not this Article’s focus. Instead, I 
want to take advantage of the BLP as a kind of natural laboratory for 
purposes of the intersection of tax law and administrative law. The 
BLP has provided a set of provisions intended to create the same 
definition of political campaign intervention for § 501(c) 
organizations in two different forms—as a set of regulations and as a 
set of statutes. Both approaches, however, will call for further 
administrative guidance, guidance that could take a number of forms. 
Depending on whether the initial set of definitions is embodied in a 
statute or in regulations, administrative guidance will have different 
levels of authority and will call for different degrees of judicial 
deference. That is, the BLP regulatory proposal and the BLP 
legislative proposal offer a unique opportunity to examine and 
compare the administrative law implications of choosing between 
regulations and legislation to establish a set of tax rules. 
A likely assumption would be that establishing this definition of 
political campaign intervention in legislation would give government 
agencies the greatest possible authority to impose limits on such 
activity. My thesis is that the opposite is likely to be the case. 
Establishing these definitions as regulations will offer advantages to 
the tax administrative agencies. If the concept is defined in statutory 
language, regulations later promulgated by the IRS and Treasury to 
clarify aspects of the statute run some risk that a court would hold 
them invalid as inconsistent with congressional intent. Promulgating 
the definition initially as a set of regulations without new statutory 
authority does not carry the same risk, given the ambiguity in the 
current statutory language. Moreover, whether the initial set of 
definitions comes in regulations or in the I.R.C., it is also likely that at 
least some later guidance would come in the form of revenue rulings, 
 
 25. See, e.g., Barnaby Zall, The Tie Goes to the Speaker, Not the Censor: Proposals To 
Change Definitions of Permissible Political Activities by Section 501(c)(4) Organizations (Sept. 
20, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://meetings.abanet.org/meeting/tax/
FALL13/media/jt-eo-cpg-helping-zall-paper.pdf; Bob Bauer, The IRS and “Bright Lines,” 
MORE SOFT MONEY HARD LAW (May 28, 2013), http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/2013/
05/irs-bright-lines; Nonprofit Blogger, The Bright Lines Project: Good Work, but It Needs 
Another Bright Line, NONPROFIT L. PROF BLOG (June 24, 2013), http://lawprofessors.
typepad.com/nonprofit/2013/06/the-bright-lines-project-good-work-but-it-needs-another-bright-
line.html; Joe Trotter, “Bright Lines Project” Fails To Live Up to Its Name, CENTER FOR 
COMPETITIVE POL. (July 12, 2013), http://www.campaignfreedom.org/2013/07/12/bright-lines-
project-fails-to-live-up-to-its-name-2.  
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which are interpretations of a particular set of facts published by the 
IRS in the Internal Revenue Bulletin.26 In the case of revenue rulings, 
judicial application of deference under Auer v. Robbins27 and Bowles 
v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.28 (Auer/Seminole Rock deference) to 
tax revenue rulings would give greater authority to revenue rulings 
interpreting regulations than to revenue rulings interpreting a 
statute.29 In short, promulgating the initial definition of political 
campaign intervention as a set of regulations may well give the IRS 
greater power to police political campaign intervention by exempt 
organizations than would enactment of legislation. 
Part I describes the BLP. Part II considers the administrative law 
implications of the BLP legislative proposal. Part III does the same 
for the regulatory proposal. 
I.  SUMMARY OF THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT 
The BLP describes the central principle guiding its efforts as 
follows: “[T]he federal tax definition of political speech . . . reaches 
beyond express advocacy and covers all speech that supports or 
opposes a candidate for elective public office.”30 In order to provide 
needed guidance to § 501(c) organizations and to carry out this 
principle, the BLP has developed a set of provisions to define political 
campaign intervention. These provisions explain the scope of the 
provisions, detail their application to other provisions of the I.R.C., 
and set forth what activities would always be treated as political 
campaign intervention, what activities might be treated as political 
campaign intervention, and what safe harbors are available. 
The BLP is structured as six categorical rules.31 The first rule 
gives the basic scope of the proposal by defining some key 
preliminary terms. It calls for the BLP proposal to apply to any 
“[f]ederal, state, local, and foreign election” and includes in the 
 
 26. For a discussion of revenue rulings, see infra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.  
 27. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
 28. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945). 
 29. See infra notes 170–75 and accompanying text. 
 30. THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT: CLARIFYING IRS RULES 
ON POLITICAL INTERVENTION, DRAFTING COMMITTEE EXPLANATION INTERIM DRAFT 2 
(2013), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/Bright%20Lines%20Project%20
Explanation.pdf (emphasis omitted). 
 31. See THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT: CLARIFYING THE IRS 
RULES FOR POLITICAL INTERVENTION (2013), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/
Bright-Lines-Proposal-(May%202013).pdf. 
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definition of candidate “a person who offers himself or herself for 
election to public office or whose election the organization expressly 
proposes, supports, or opposes.”32 
The second rule proposes a broad application of the BLP’s 
definition of political campaign intervention. The BLP would apply 
its proposal to “the prohibition on IRC 501(c)(3) organizations and 
the tax penalties under 4955 and 4945, . . . political intervention that is 
not within exempt purposes for other 501(c) groups, . . . the proxy tax 
paid by some 501(c) entities under 6033(e), and . . . the denial of a 
business expense deduction under 162(e)(1)(B).”33 
The BLP’s third rule defines political campaign intervention to 
include express advocacy,34 including any communication that is the 
functional equivalent of express advocacy.35 The Drafting Committee 
includes the following example of a communication that is the 
functional equivalent of express advocacy: 
An organization in State X runs a television advertisement with the 
following text: 
What kind of leader is Senator Doe? Ineffective. Ultra-liberal. 
Unrepresentative of our state’s values. Senator Doe voted for 
increasing Tricare premiums to nickel and dime America’s heroes. 
Veterans and service men and women know better than to trust 
Senator Doe. This November: support new voices, support your 
military, support State X values.36 
The Drafting Committee also notes, 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. The IRS and Treasury have recently proposed a definition of “candidate-related 
political activity” for § 501(c)(4) organizations. They asked whether the proposed regulations 
should apply as well to other § 501(c) organizations, but suggested a different set of regulations 
might be appropriate for § 501(c)(3) organizations. See supra note 9; infra note 135. 
 34. The rule describes express advocacy as: 
(a) the election, defeat, nomination, or recall of a clearly-identified candidate; 
(b) the election or defeat of candidates affiliated with a specific political party; 
(c) that voters select candidates for support or opposition based on one or more 
criteria that clearly distinguish certain candidates from other candidates; 
(d) the making of contributions to a candidate, party, or any organization that has the 
primary purpose of engaging in political intervention. 
THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, supra note 31. 
 35. See THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, supra note 30, at 9. 
 36. Id. at 9–10. Parts II and III focus on the format in which administrative guidance 
incorporating examples would be issued and the deference courts would give that guidance.  
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Historically, the IRS interpretation of the ban on political 
intervention by charities has been widely understood to go beyond 
express advocacy . . . . However, it is important to capture those 
instances of speech that do constitute express advocacy as a starting 
point for determining what speech undeniably should be within the 
definition of political intervention . . . .37 
Consistent with its central principle, the BLP goes further. Its 
fourth rule, dubbed the General Speech Rule, broadens the definition 
of political campaign intervention to cover “any communication to 
any part of the electorate” if the communication both “refers to a 
clearly identified candidate” and “reflects a view on that candidate.”38 
This fourth rule offers four safe harbors, which are applicable only if 
the communication does not consist of paid media advertising. The 
safe harbors comprise influencing official action, comparing 
candidates, acting in self-defense, and making personal oral remarks 
at official meetings.39 The Drafting Committee Explanation offers a 
nice example of the distinction between the general rule and the safe 
harbors: 
Organization S prepares and distributes a posting on a social media 
site criticizing the fact that state C’s two senators voted against the 
Marriage Protection Amendment, and asking viewers to call them to 
urge them to support it. Contemporary news reports indicate that it 
is likely, but not certain, that a vote will be scheduled on the 
Marriage Protection Amendment in the near future. Organization S 
has not engaged in political intervention. However, if there was no 
reasonable chance that a vote on the issue would be held before the 
election, the communication would not qualify for the safe harbor.40 
The fifth rule further expands the definition of political campaign 
intervention to cover supplying any of the organization’s resources to 
another person or entity for use in political campaign intervention, at 
least if such use is reasonably foreseeable.41 According to the Drafting 
 
 37. Id. at 8. 
 38. THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, supra note 31. 
 39. THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, supra note 30, at 15–24. The last safe harbor represents a 
major change. In many cases, it would, for example, protect remarks of a minister made from 
the pulpit. See Nonprofit Blogger, supra note 25. 
 40. THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, supra note 30, at 17. The Drafting Committee 
Explanation includes a total of thirty-five examples, see id. at 9–10, 16–18, 20–23, 27–29, 31–33, 
of which twenty-one relate to the safe harbors, see id. at 16–18, 20–23.  
 41. THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, supra note 31.  
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Committee Explanation, an example of such use of resources is the 
following: 
Save the Canines, a tax-exempt organization, allows City Council 
Member W to use its auditorium, free of charge, for a Town Hall 
Forum to discuss City Council business, including a proposed dog 
park. W is running for reelection, and her campaign sets up a table 
in the auditorium handing out campaign literature, bumper stickers, 
and requests for campaign contributions. There is no written rental 
agreement, and Save the Canines officials are present at the event 
and do not say anything about the campaign activity. Under local 
election law, in-kind contributions of $500 or more must be reported 
as campaign contributions.42 
A number of exceptions apply to the “transfer of resources” category 
as well: transfers at no less than fair market value, a history of similar 
transactions by the organization, and transfers that do not favor any 
candidate.43 
The sixth rule introduces “facts and circumstances” to the BLP.44 
For communications that do not meet the threshold of the General 
Speech Rule, that are not targeted to voters, and that do not come 
within an exception, the BLP’s sixth recommended rule would permit 
consideration of such factors as “timing, the range of issues discussed, 
disclaimers and disclosures, the organization’s history, the 
impartiality of its methods, or corrective steps taken” in both 
determining whether political campaign intervention has taken place 
and in considering any penalty for violations.45 The Drafting 
Committee Explanation includes the following example: 
On October 5, Louisiana Moms Against Guns runs a final 
newspaper ad thanking Governor D for his courageous act in signing 
into law a bill banning the carrying of concealed weapons on school 
grounds, after running a series of ads urging him to do so. Louisiana 
Moms makes a practice of running “thank you” ads when the target 
of a lobbying campaign takes the requested action. Governor D is 
up for re-election in November. The Governor signed the bill on 
October 4. The ad does not include express advocacy, but refers to a 
clearly-identified candidate and reflects a view on that candidate. It 
 
 42. THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, supra note 30, at 28.  
 43. THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, supra note 31. 
 44. Id. Because this set of provisions relies on facts and circumstances, rather than bright 
lines, it has been particularly controversial. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 45. THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, supra note 31.  
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is a paid mass media ad and therefore cannot fall within any of the 
safe harbor exceptions. Considering these as the only pertinent facts 
and circumstances, due to the close proximity of the ad to the 
official action, the fact that the ad does not mention the Governor’s 
reelection, and the organization’s history of running similar ads, the 
organization has met its burden of proof that intervention did not 
occur.46 
The BLP legislative proposal does not, of course, include the 
Drafting Committee’s examples. It does, however, grant regulatory 
authority. This regulatory authority is unusual in that it is, on the one 
hand, very detailed and, on the other hand, sweeping in its goals: 
The Secretary of the Treasury shall prescribe, update, and modify 
such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to clarify 
further the standards set forth in this section in light of current and 
future changes in campaign practices, to meet the objectives of this 
section to promote civic participation in democracy, curb abuses, 
and allow organizations to reasonably anticipate the tax 
consequences of their activities in advance.47 
Other broad delegations of regulatory authority, in contrast, do not 
specify motive or purpose.48 For example, § 1502, perhaps the 
broadest grant of regulatory authority in the I.R.C., given the 
sparseness of the legislative language in § 1501 providing the statutory 
rules governing consolidated returns, states that 
[t]he Secretary shall prescribe such regulations, as he may deem 
necessary in order that the tax liability of any affiliated group of 
corporations making a consolidated return and of each corporation 
in the group . . . may be returned, determined, computed, assessed, 
collected, and adjusted, in such manner as clearly to reflect the 
income-tax liability and the various factors necessary for the 
 
 46. THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, supra note 30, at 32.  
 47. THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS: NEW SECTION 4956, at 5 
(2013), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/new-section-4956-political-intervention.
pdf. For the reasons explained below, the BLP should amend the regulatory grant in its 
legislative proposal to more closely resemble other broad grants of regulatory authority. See 
infra notes 61–62 and accompanying text. 
 48. See generally Kimberly S. Blanchard, N.Y.S. Bar Ass’n Tax Section, Report on 
Legislative Grants of Regulatory Authority, TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 7, 2006, available at 
LEXIS, 2006 TNT 215-22 (cataloguing and comparing regulator grants in the I.R.C.). 
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determination of such liability, and in order to prevent avoidance of 
such tax liability.49 
The regulations under § 1502 run to almost 350 pages of small print. 
The regulatory grant under § 469, the passive loss provisions, states 
that “the Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as may be 
necessary or appropriate to carry out provisions of this section,”50 
although it also names some specific issues the regulations might 
address.51 
Regulations promulgated under the statutory grant of authority 
proposed by the BLP could well include the examples discussed in the 
Drafting Committee Explanation.52 Such regulations, however, would 
stand on a slightly different ground than regulations promulgated 
without such a specific statutory grant of authority, as detailed further 
below. 
II.  IMPLICATIONS OF THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT’S LEGISLATIVE 
PROPOSAL 
Article I, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution declares, “All 
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the 
United States.”53 Section 8 grants Congress authority “to make all 
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution” enumerated powers and “all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any 
Department or Officer thereof.”54 
As a result, both courts and administrative agencies must defer 
to enacted legislation. As the Supreme Court stated in the now-
famous Step One of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources 
 
 49. I.R.C. § 1502 (2012). The regulatory grant does contain some additional general 
direction. For example, it specifies that “the Secretary may prescribe rules that are different 
from the provisions of chapter 1 that would apply if such corporations filed separate returns.” 
Id. 
 50. Id. § 469(l). 
 51. Section 469(l) lists four possible regulatory topics, including, for example, “what 
constitutes an activity, material participation, or active participation for purposes of this 
section.” Id.  
 52. Treasury regulations frequently include examples. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.117-2(b)(3) 
(1960) (scholarships); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9T(f)(4)(iv) (2008) (public support test for 
charities); Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(d)(2)(iv) (as amended in 2011) (valuation of annuities for 
estate tax purposes). 
 53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.  
 54. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.  
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Defense Council, Inc.,55 “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the 
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect 
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”56 Thus, if the 
BLP legislative proposal is adopted—thereby rendering its 
recommendations as statutory provisions, its recommendations 
themselves, at least to the extent they are clear, would have greater 
authority than essentially the same provisions adopted in the form of 
regulations promulgated under current I.R.C. provisions. 
Step Two of Chevron, however, directs that, if Congress has not 
unambiguously expressed its intent, a court is to ask only “whether 
the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.”57 If so, Chevron explains, the court is to defer to the 
administrative agency. In the words of Professor Cass Sunstein, this 
highly deferential standard to administrative agencies represents “a 
kind of revolution[,] . . . not only as a counter-Marbury for the 
modern era but also as a kind of McCulloch v. Maryland, granting the 
executive broad discretion to choose its own preferred means to 
promote statutory ends.”58 
Under Step Two of Chevron, were the IRS and Treasury to 
follow up on the BLP legislative proposal with regulations—at least 
those that go through notice-and-comment rulemaking,59 examples of 
 
 55. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
 56. Id. at 842–43. Of course, statutes themselves can be held unconstitutional. Some critics 
of the BLP find its broad definition of political campaign intervention inconsistent with current 
First Amendment doctrine. See Zall, supra note 25, at 33–34; Trotter, supra note 25. Under 
Chevron if the statute is not clear, courts move to Step Two and defer to administrative agencies 
unless the agency interpretation is unreasonable. See infra note 57 and accompanying text. 
However, “[t]he Supreme Court has reversed an agency interpretation as unreasonable under 
Step Two only twice, so most of the judicial focus has targeted Step One and the search for 
unambiguous statutory meaning.” WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & 
ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 328–29 (2d ed. 2006) 
(footnote omitted).  
 57. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
 58. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power To Say What the Law Is, 115 
YALE L.J. 2580, 2596 (2006) (footnote omitted). 
 59. In United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), the Supreme Court wrote that 
Chevron deference would apply  
when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make 
rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference 
was promulgated in the exercise of that authority. Delegation of such authority may 
be shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency’s power to engage in adjudication or 
notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some other indication of a comparable 
congressional intent.  
Id. at 226–27. As Professor Hickman notes, “Since deciding Mead, the Court has often linked 
the agency’s use of notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures with a rule’s eligibility for 
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which are included in the BLP regulatory proposal—it is likely that 
courts would defer to these regulations and give them the force of 
law, given the need to further explain the statutory terms and the 
broad grant of regulatory authority in the proposed legislation.60 This 
treatment would particularly be the case if the legislative history of 
the statute were to include examples that now appear in the Drafting 
Committee Explanation. 
Nonetheless, enactment of the rules as a statute could constrain 
the IRS and Treasury in promulgating regulations. “The 
judiciary . . . must reject administrative constructions which are 
contrary to clear congressional intent.”61 It is thus conceivable that a 
court could view some regulation promulgated in the future as 
inconsistent with the statute. In this regard, the detailed language of 
the regulatory grant could prove problematic. For example, a court 
could decide that some old regulation promulgated under this 
proposed statute no longer reflected current campaign practices or 
could deem some future regulation adopted for administrative 
convenience as inconsistent with the regulatory requirement that 
regulations “promote civic participation in democracy.”62 
The IRS, however, could well choose to give guidance through a 
series of revenue rulings interpreting the statute rather than through 
promulgating regulations. Revenue rulings are official IRS 
interpretations that appear in the Internal Revenue Bulletin. 
Revenue Procedure 2012-4 further defines a revenue ruling as “the 
conclusion of the Service on how the law is applied to a specific set of 
facts . . . published for the information and guidance of taxpayers, 
Service personnel, and other interested parties.”63 Procedural IRS 
regulations state that the purpose of revenue rulings is 
to promote correct and uniform application of the tax laws by 
Internal Revenue Service employees and to assist taxpayers in 
attaining maximum voluntary compliance by informing Service 
 
Chevron deference.” Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 
489 (2013); see id. at 489 n.125 (citing cases). For further discussion of Mead, see infra notes 75–
93 and accompanying text. 
 60. See Hickman, supra note 59, at 475–77. 
 61. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. 
 62. THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, supra note 47, at 5. 
 63. Rev. Proc. 2012-4, 2012-1 I.R.B. 125, 130. The IRS also explains in the introduction to 
each issue of the Internal Revenue Bulletin that guidance published therein, such as revenue 
procedures and revenue rulings, “do[es] not have the force and effect of Treasury Department 
Regulations.” 2013-44 I.R.B. 426. 
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personnel and the public of National Office interpretations of the 
internal revenue laws, related statutes, treaties, regulations, and 
statements of Service procedures affecting the rights and duties of 
taxpayers.64 
Taxpayers generally may rely on revenue rulings as guidance 
regarding the application of the tax law to “substantially the same” 
facts.65 
The current precedential guidance regarding the meaning of 
political campaign intervention relies on revenue rulings and the 
examples they contain. Revenue Ruling 2007-41, in addition to stating 
the facts-and-circumstances standard, provides twenty-one situations 
to illustrate its principle as to what is and is not political campaign 
intervention for § 501(c)(3) organizations.66 Revenue Ruling 2004-6 
offers six situations to clarify political campaign intervention for 
purposes of § 527, the provision governing political organizations.67 
 
 64. Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(iii) (as amended in 1987). 
 65. Id. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(e). 
 66. See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421, 1422–26. Situation 13, for example, states: 
Mayor G attends a concert performed by Symphony S, a section 501(c)(3) 
organization, in City Park. The concert is free and open to the public. Mayor G is a 
candidate for reelection, and the concert takes place after the primary and before the 
general election. During the concert, the chairman of S’s board addresses the crowd 
and says, “I am pleased to see Mayor G here tonight. Without his support, these free 
concerts in City Park would not be possible. We will need his help if we want these 
concerts to continue next year so please support Mayor G in November as he has 
supported us.” As a result of these remarks, Symphony S has engaged in political 
campaign intervention. 
Id. at 1424. 
 67. Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2004-1 C.B. 328, 330–32. In Situation 2, for example: 
O, a trade association recognized as tax exempt under § 501(c)(6), advocates for 
increased international trade. Senator C represents State V in the United States 
Senate. O prepares and finances a full-page newspaper advertisement that is 
published in several large circulation newspapers in State V shortly before an election 
in which Senator C is a candidate for nomination in a party primary. The 
advertisement states that increased international trade is important to a major 
industry in State V. The advertisement states that S. 24, a pending bill in the United 
States Senate, would provide manufacturing subsidies to certain industries to 
encourage export of their products. The advertisement also states that several 
manufacturers in State V would benefit from the subsidies, but Senator C has 
opposed similar measures supporting increased international trade in the past. The 
advertisement ends with the statement “Call or write Senator C to tell him to vote for 
S. 24.” International trade concerns have not been raised as an issue distinguishing 
Senator C from any opponent. S. 24 is scheduled for a vote in the United States 
Senate before the election, soon after the date that the advertisement is published in 
the newspapers. 
Id. at 331. Because the advertisement names specific legislation on which Senator C is going to 
vote, the revenue ruling concludes that it does not constitute political campaign intervention for 
the purpose of § 527. Id. 
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Using revenue rulings to clarify statutory language would avoid 
the burden of promulgating regulations. Regulations, unlike revenue 
rulings, are subject to the highest levels of review within the IRS and 
Treasury and generally afford the public notice and the opportunity 
for comment.68 In contrast, although revenue rulings require written 
approval by the IRS chief counsel and review by the Office of the IRS 
Commission and by Treasury’s Office of Tax Policy, they do not 
involve public comment or formal signature by the IRS 
Commissioner and Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy.69 Revenue 
rulings name the staff lawyer in the Office of Chief Counsel who is 
the principal author and list that person’s phone number in case 
further information is desired.70 
The appropriate level of judicial deference given to such revenue 
rulings is less certain than that given to regulations.71 A number of 
scholars, including myself, have argued that revenue rulings are 
entitled only to deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,72 which is a 
far lesser degree of deference than Chevron deference.73 Under 
 
 68. See generally IRM 32.1 (Chief Counsel Regulation Handbook); id. 32.2 (Chief Counsel 
Publication Handbook); Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s 
(Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1727, 1728 (2007); Kristin E. Hickman, IRB Guidance: The No Man’s Land of 
Tax Code Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 239, 250–52 [hereinafter Hickman, No Man’s 
Land]. 
 69. See Irving Salem, Ellen P. Aprill & Linda Galler, ABA Section of Taxation Report of 
the Task Force on Judicial Deference, 57 TAX LAW. 717, 736 (2004); see also Hickman, No Man’s 
Land, supra note 68, at 243–46 (discussing revenue rulings); Hickman, supra note 59, at 502–09 
(same). 
 70. Salem et al., supra note 69, at 736. 
 71. Similar questions arise in connection with notices published in the Internal Revenue 
Bulletin: 
A notice is a public pronouncement that may contain guidance that involves 
substantive interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code or other provisions of the 
law. For example, notices can be used to relate what regulations will say in situations 
where the regulations may not be published in the immediate future. 
Understanding IRS Guidance – A Brief Primer, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/uac/Understanding-IRS-
Guidance-A-Brief-Primer (last visited Mar. 13, 2014); see Hickman, No Man’s Land, supra note 
68, at 249–52 (discussing the uncertain origins of notices); Hickman, supra note 59, at 468–70 
(noting that the IRS “relies heavily on informal guidance documents,” including notices). To 
simplify discussion, I am going to assume that guidance issued by the IRS regarding political 
campaign intervention will take the form of regulations with notice and comment or revenue 
rulings.  
 72. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 73. See Salem et al., supra note 69, at 744–46; see also Ellen P. Aprill, The Interpretive 
Voice, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2081, 2109 (2005) (discussing the Tax Court’s traditional position on 
deference to revenue rulings and the implications of several cases for that position); Leandra 
Lederman, The Fight over “Fighting Regs” and Judicial Deference in Tax Litigation, 92 B.U. L. 
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Skidmore deference, agency guidance receives deference as a court 
sees fit, based on the document’s “power to persuade,” which in turn 
depends on “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the 
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to 
persuade, if lacking power to control.”74 
Whether revenue rulings receive Skidmore or Chevron deference 
depends in good measure on how United States v. Mead Corp.75 
applies to revenue rulings. In Mead, the Supreme Court announced 
that agency guidance merits Chevron deference only if “Congress 
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the 
force of law, and . . . the agency interpretation claiming deference was 
promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”76 Applying this test, 
the Court decided that a U.S. Customs Service letter ruling was 
entitled to Skidmore, not Chevron, deference.77 Unfortunately, the 
Court failed to specify the meaning of “force of law” and 
“promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” It stated that 
Chevron deference would apply “when it appears that Congress 
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the 
force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference 
was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”78 According to the 
Court, “Delegation of such authority may be shown in a variety of 
ways, as by an agency’s power to engage in adjudication or notice-
and-comment rulemaking, or by some other indication of a 
comparable congressional intent.”79 The case did not fully explain the 
meaning of “a variety of ways.” 
In reaction to the Court’s lack of clarity, Justice Scalia issued a 
strongly worded dissent. He criticized the Court for replacing the 
clarity of Chevron with “th’ol’ ‘totality of the circumstances test.’”80 
He warned, “We will be sorting out the consequences of the Mead 
doctrine, which has today replaced the Chevron doctrine, for years to 
 
REV. 643, 663–71 (2012) (noting that “[c]ommentators generally support the application of 
Skidmore to Revenue Rulings” but that the amount of “deference courts accord Revenue 
Rulings is not entirely clear”). 
 74. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.  
 75. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).  
 76. Id. at 226–27. 
 77. Id. at 234–35. 
 78. Id. at 226–27. 
 79. Id. at 227. 
 80. Id. at 245 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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come. . . . The Court’s new doctrine is neither sound in principle nor 
sustainable in practice.”81 
Mead has worried commentators as well. As Professor Ronald 
Levin has observed, what the Court meant by the “critical phrase,” 
force of law, “is not easy to pin down. . . . The Court’s commitment to 
that [‘force of law’] test seems less than unequivocal, and the Court 
also seems unsure about how to apply it.”82 Writing four years after 
Mead, Professor Lisa Schultz Bressman concluded that Justice Scalia 
“actually understated the effect of Mead,” when, in his dissent, he 
“predicted that judicial review of agency action would devolve into 
chaos.”83 To try to make sense of the case, Professor Sunstein has 
analyzed Mead as Chevron Step Zero because it addresses “whether 
the Chevron framework applies at all.”84 
Nonetheless, in a recent article, attorney Patrick Smith, who 
often writes about the intersection of tax and administrative law,85 
concluded, “When the Mead test is applied to revenue rulings, it is 
clear that they are ineligible for Chevron deference. Revenue rulings 
are not issued using notice and comment procedures, and the IRS 
does not claim that revenue rulings have the force of law.”86 Others, 
however, have taken the position that revenue rulings, like 
regulations, could or should be afforded Chevron deference. At one 
time, the Department of Justice argued that such documents merited 
Chevron deference, but it has since abandoned this position.87 
Specially concurring in a 2008 Ninth Circuit case, Judge O’Scannlain, 
relying on the statement in Mead that delegation of authority could 
be shown in any of a number of ways,88 wrote, “I hope . . . that the 
formality of a particular agency action, standing alone, does not 
 
 81. Id. at 239, 241 (citation omitted). 
 82. Ronald M. Levin, Mead and the Prospective Exercise of Discretion, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 
771, 774, 776 (2002).  
 83. Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 
VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1443–44 (2005). 
 84. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2006). 
 85. See generally, e.g., Patrick J. Smith, Chevron Step Zero After City of Arlington, 1140 
TAX NOTES 743 (2013); Patrick J. Smith, District Court Misapplies APA in Florida Bankers 
Association, 142 TAX NOTES 75 (2014); Patrick J. Smith, May Regulations That Violate the APA 
Be Remanded to the IRS?, 141 TAX NOTES 84 (2013).  
 86. Patrick J. Smith, Quality Stores and the Status of Revenue Rulings, 140 TAX NOTES 
1089, 1093 (2013). 
 87. See Marie Sapire, ABA Section of Taxation Meeting: DOJ Won’t Push Chevron 
Deference for Revenue Rulings, 131 TAX NOTES 674 (2011). 
 88. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
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determine the level of deference it receives.”89 In the case, Judge 
O’Scannlain would have granted Chevron deference to a revenue 
procedure.90 Since then, the Ninth Circuit has not resolved the 
question of whether revenue rulings receive Skidmore or Chevron 
deference.91 Recently, Professor Kristin Hickman has argued that, 
because the IRS applied penalty provisions for failure to follow 
guidance documents such as revenue rulings, these rulings carry the 
force of law and would be entitled to Chevron deference, because a 
taxpayer’s failure to follow them can result in penalties. However, she 
also believes that revenue rulings, to be valid, must be promulgated 
with notice-and-comment rulemaking as required by the 
Administrative Procedure Act92 (APA) for legislative rules.93 
Which of these views regarding the level of deference due to 
revenue rulings interpreting statutory language94 ultimately prevails 
will have significant consequences for IRS administration of the tax 
law, not only in the case of any statute that defines political 
intervention, but also more generally. From an instrumental rather 
than a normative viewpoint, if revenue rulings issued without notice 
and comment merit Chevron deference, the IRS may have little 
incentive to go to the trouble of promulgating regulations with notice 
and comment. 
The Supreme Court could have resolved the question regarding 
the level of deference to revenue rulings interpreting a statute when it 
 
 89. Tualatin Valley Builders Supply, Inc. v. United States, 522 F.3d 937, 946 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(O’Scannlain, J., specially concurring).  
 90. Id. The IRS explains, 
A revenue procedure is an official statement of a procedure that affects the rights or 
duties of taxpayers or other members of the public under the Internal Revenue Code, 
related statutes, tax treaties and regulations and that should be a matter of public 
knowledge. It is also published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin. While a revenue 
ruling generally states an IRS position, a revenue procedure provides return filing or 
other instructions concerning an IRS position. 
Understanding IRS Guidance – A Brief Primer, supra note 71. The Internal Revenue Manual 
32.2.2.3.2 includes a similar definition. See IRM 32.2.2.3.2 (Aug. 11, 2004) (“A revenue 
procedure is an official statement of a procedure by the Service that affects the rights or duties 
of taxpayers or other members of the public under the Internal Revenue Code, related statutes, 
tax treaties, and regulations, or information that, although not necessarily affecting the rights 
and duties of the public, should be a matter of public knowledge.”). 
 91. See Taproot Admin. Servs., Inc. v. Comm’r, 679 F.3d 1109, 1115 n.14 (9th Cir. 2012).  
 92. Administrative Procedure Act § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
 93. See Hickman, supra note 59, at 542. 
 94. As discussed below, yet a third kind of deference may be appropriate when revenue 
rulings interpret regulations. See infra notes 129–30 and accompanying text. 
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decided United States v. Quality Stores, Inc.,95 in 2014. That is, the 
Court in Quality Stores could have clarified, whether, under Mead, 
such revenue rulings receive Skidmore or Chevron deference. 
However, it did not do so. 
The substantive issue in Quality Stores was whether tax under 
the Federal Insurance Contribution Act96 (FICA), which encompasses 
Social Security and Medicare, is due on severance pay that qualifies 
as supplemental unemployment compensation benefit (SUB) 
payments. The Sixth Circuit held that it is not.97 The Federal Circuit, 
however, took the opposite position in CSX Corp. v. United States.98 
FICA does not expressly address SUB payments,99 and no 
regulations address the issue.100 A number of revenue rulings, 
however, perform this function—most recently, Revenue Ruling 90-
72.101 According to Revenue Ruling 90-72, SUB payments are exempt 
from the definition of wages under FICA only if they are made to 
involuntarily separated employees pursuant to a plan that is designed 
to supplement the receipt of state employment compensation.102 The 
ruling also concludes that payments in a lump sum cannot be linked 
to state employment compensation and thus are not excluded from 
FICA.103 
 
 95. United States v. Quality Stores, Inc., No. 12-1408, 2014 WL 1168968 (U.S. Mar. 25, 
2014). 
 96. Federal Insurance Contribution Act, I.R.C. §§ 3101–3128 (2012). 
 97. United States v. Quality Stores, Inc., 693 F.3d 605, 607–08 (2012), rev’d, No. 12-1408, 
2014 WL 1168968 (U.S. Mar. 25, 2014).  
 98. CSX Corp. v. United States, 518 F.3d 1328, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The Government’s 
petition for certiorari in Quality Stores also cites Otte v. United States, 419 U.S. 43 (1974), Social 
Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358 (1946), University of Pittsburgh v. United States, 507 
F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2007), and Abrahamsen v. United States, 228 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2000), as 
inconsistent with the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20–25, 
Quality Stores, 2014 WL 1168968 (No. 12-1408).  
 99. See Quality Stores, 693 F.3d at 611. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Other revenue rulings addressing the issue include Rev. Rul. 77-347, 1977-2 C.B. 363 
(indicating that SUB benefits from trust fund established by employer are not wages for FICA 
or the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), I.R.C. §§ 3301–3311 (2012)); Rev. Rul. 60-330, 
1960-2 C.B. 46 (indicating that SUB payments made directly to former employees are not wages 
for Federal employment tax purposes); Rev. Rul. 58-128, 1958-1 C.B. 93 (concluding that Rev. 
Rul. 56-249, 1956-1 C.B. 488 applies also to similar payments, even if not union negotiated but 
unilaterally established by an employer); and Rev. Rul. 56-249, 1956-1 C.B. 488 (indicating that 
employer payments supplement SUB payments, not wages for FICA or FUTA). The 1990 
revenue ruling discussed in the text reversed the 1977 revenue ruling. 
 102. Rev. Rul. 90-72, 1990-2 C.B. 211. 
 103. See Quality Stores, 693 F.3d at 619. 
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The Sixth Circuit rejected reliance on the IRS revenue rulings 
“in favor of the expressed will of the legislature.”104 It looked to 
legislative history, which spoke of authority to issue regulations 
decoupling the meaning of “wages” for purposes of income tax 
withholding and FICA. Given the absence of such regulations, the 
court relied on the definition of wages in § 3402 of the I.R.C., which 
defines the term for purposes of income tax withholding. Section 
3402(a) defines SUB payments and excludes them from the definition 
of wages.105 The Sixth Circuit cited Rowan v. United States,106 which 
concluded that Congress intended wages to have the same meaning 
for purposes of income tax withholding and FICA.107 Thus, the Sixth 
Circuit found that the IRS revenue rulings conflicted with 
congressional intent.108 Furthermore, according to the Sixth Circuit, 
revenue rulings do not merit Chevron deference because, in issuing 
revenue rulings, “the IRS does not invoke its authority to make rules 
with the force of law.”109 
The Federal Circuit in CSX Corp., however, held that SUB 
payments are subject to FICA. It did not read § 3402, the provision 
excluding SUB payments from the definition of wages for income tax 
withholding, as requiring that SUB treatments be excluded from 
wages for purposes of FICA.110 That is, it rejected the taxpayer’s 
argument that the term “wages” in § 3402(o) governs the meaning of 
wages for purposes of FICA.111 Without specifying the level of 
deference or the importance of consistency, the Federal Circuit found 
that CSX’s payments would not satisfy “the IRS’s administrative 
exclusion of SUB benefits from wages under Rev. Rul. 90-72 and its 
predecessors, as the IRS has construed and applied those rulings.”112 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. See id. at 611–13. 
 106. Rowan v. United States, 452 U.S. 247 (1981). 
 107. See Quality Stores, 693 F.3d at 613 (stating Rowan’s holding in this manner and citing 
Rowan, 452 U.S. at 255–57). 
 108. See id. at 616–20. 
 109. See id. at 619 (quoting Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc. v. Comm’r, 347 F.3d 173, 181 (6th Cir. 
2003)) (quotation marks omitted). “In appropriate circumstances we may give substantial 
judicial deference to longstanding and reasonable interpretations of IRS regulations and 
revenue rulings, but in this case we conclude . . . that the IRS has not taken congressional intent 
fully into account.” Id. at 620 (citation omitted). 
 110. CSX Corp. v. United States, 518 F.3d 1328, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 111. Id. at 1345. 
 112. Id. 
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If the Supreme Court had agreed with the Federal Circuit that 
congressional intent as expressed in the statute is unclear regarding 
FICA and SUB payments, the level of deference the Court assigns 
revenue rulings interpreting a statute could have played an important 
role in the Quality Stores decision. If revenue rulings are entitled only 
to Skidmore deference, courts would be relatively free to provide 
their own interpretations of the statute, particularly in light of 
inconsistency in the SUB revenue rulings.113 If instead the Court had 
accepted the arguments of those who argued for Chevron deference, 
the position of Revenue Ruling 90-72 would govern, because agencies 
are free to change positions without loss of Chevron deference.114 
On the other hand, if the Supreme Court had adopted the 
position of the Sixth Circuit that the IRS revenue rulings are 
inconsistent with congressional intent, it would not have needed to 
reach the question of what level of deference to give revenue rulings 
interpreting a statute. Clear congressional intent ends the deference 
inquiry; congressional intent will trump administrative guidance that 
receives Chevron deference, much less guidance that receives only 
Skidmore deference. In fact, the Solicitor General during the oral 
argument disavowed reliance on the revenue rulings and chose to rely 
on the statutory text.115 
 
 113. The taxpayer’s brief in Quality Stores argued that revenue rulings regarding SUB 
payments do not merit Chevron deference and that they lack the power to persuade under 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), because of their inconsistency and lack of sound 
reasoning. Brief for Respondents at 49–59, Quality Stores, 2014 WL 1168968 (No. 12-1408), 2013 
WL 6492303, at *49–59. An amicus brief from the American Benefits Council, authored by 
Patrick Smith, made similar arguments, Brief of Amicus Curiae the American Benefits Council 
in Support of Respondents at 11–17, Quality Stores, 2014 WL 1168968 (No. 12-1408), as did the 
amicus brief of American Payroll Association, Brief of American Payroll Ass’n as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Respondents, Quality Stores, 2014 WL 1168968 (No. 12-1408). Professor 
Kristin Hickman submitted an amicus brief in the case, arguing, as she has in her scholarship, 
that revenue rulings are entitled to Chevron deference, but only if promulgated with notice and 
comment. See Brief of Professor Kristin E. Hickman as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither 
Party at 28–33, Quality Stores, 2014 WL 1168968 (No. 12-1408), 2013 WL 6114794, at *28–33. 
 114. Justice Scalia explained in his Mead dissent, “As Chevron itself held, the 
Environmental Protection Agency can interpret ‘stationary source’ to mean a single 
smokestack, can later replace that interpretation with the ‘bubble concept’ embracing an entire 
plant, and if that proves undesirable can return again to the original interpretation.” United 
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 247 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Aprill, supra note 73, 
at 2113–18. 
 115. Eric J. Feigin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, stated during oral argument that “we 
acknowledge that the revenue rulings are not consistent with the statutory text.” Transcript of 
Oral Argument at 26, Quality Stores, 2014 WL 1168968 (No. 12-1408), 2014 WL 262860, at *26. 
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The Court, however, decided the case in favor of the 
government, based on its interpretation of the statutory text.116 It 
rejected “the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of § 3402(o) as 
standing for some broad definition principle.”117 The Supreme Court 
relied instead on “FICA’s broad definition of wages.”118 It noted that 
IRS revenue rulings, including Revenue Ruling 90-72, exempting 
certain severance payments from both FICA and income-tax 
withholding were “not at issue here.”119 Thus, despite the arguments 
of the taxpayer and some amici in Quality Stores,120 the Supreme 
Court did not provide guidance as to the level of deference that 
courts should afford revenue rulings. 
Under current law, in which revenue rulings interpreting statutes 
are most likely to receive Skidmore deference, the BLP legislative 
proposal would give the greatest force to the rules themselves. 
Interpretations of the statute by the IRS and Treasury, whether in 
regulations or revenue rulings, may be vulnerable to challenge as 
inconsistent with the statute. However, as discussed below in 
connection with the BLP regulatory proposal, revenue rulings 
interpreting regulations rather than the statute itself may claim a 
stronger form of deference than revenue rulings interpreting a 
statute. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS OF THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT’S REGULATORY 
PROPOSAL 
Should the BLP’s proposal be promulgated as stand-alone 
regulations under the current I.R.C., rather than as regulations 
promulgated pursuant to a specific grant of regulatory authority in a 
new statute, different issues would arise as to their validity.121 Such 
 
 116. Quality Stores, 2014 WL 1168968, at *10. 
 117. Id. at *8.  
 118. Id. at *10. 
 119. Id. The opinion continued, “Because the severance payments here were not linked to 
state unemployment benefits, the Court does not reach the question of whether the IRS’ current 
exemption is consistent with the broad definition of wages under FICA.” Id. 
 120. See supra note 113. 
 121. For purposes of this Article, I am assuming any such regulations would be promulgated 
with notice and comment, and thus would not raise the particular issues that ensue when the 
IRS issues temporary regulations without notice and comment. See Ellen P. Aprill, The Impact 
of Agency Procedures and Judicial Review on Tax Reform, 65 NAT’L TAX J. 917, 925–27 (2012) 
(reviewing the “serious” validity questions that interim final regulations provoke); Hickman, 
supra note 59, at 471–72 (noting the “significant potential difficulties for the stability of the 
federal income tax system” caused by the interpretation of temporary regulations). 
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regulations would be promulgated under the general authority of 
§ 7805(a), which specifies that “the Secretary shall prescribe all 
needful rules and regulations” for the enforcement of the Internal 
Revenue Code (“general authority regulations”).122 
Until recently, it was uncertain whether such general-authority 
Treasury regulations would be entitled to the same deference from 
courts as specific-authority regulations. A long tradition, particularly 
in the Tax Court, was to afford less deference to Treasury regulations 
than that afforded by Chevron deference.123 This tradition relied on 
National Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States,124 in which the 
Supreme Court stated, in connection with a general-authority 
regulation: 
A regulation may have particular force if it is a substantially 
contemporaneous construction of the statute by those presumed to 
have been aware of congressional intent. If the regulation dates 
from a later period, the manner in which it evolved merits inquiry. 
Other relevant considerations are the length of time the regulation 
has been in effect, the reliance placed on it, the consistency of the 
Commissioner’s interpretation, and the degree of scrutiny Congress 
has devoted to the regulation during subsequent re-enactments of 
the statute.125 
In other cases, the Supreme Court suggested that courts owe less 
deference to a general-authority regulation than to a specific-
authority regulation.126 Before 2011, the Court was inconsistent in its 
application of National Muffler and Chevron in reviewing tax 
regulations.127 
The Supreme Court, however, resolved this uncertainty when it 
decided Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. 
United States128 in 2011. In addressing a regulation promulgated with 
 
 122. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2012). 
 123. See Ellen P. Aprill, Muffled Chevron: Judicial Review of Tax Regulations, 3 FLA. TAX 
REV. 51, 67–73 (1996); Lederman, supra note 73, at 646; Salem et al., supra note 69, at 721–22. 
The vast majority of tax cases are litigated in Tax Court, which does not require taxpayers to 
pay disputed amounts before bringing suit. Leandra Lederman, (Un)Appealing Deference to the 
Tax Court, 63 DUKE L.J. 1835, 1836–37 (2014); see Gerald Kafka, Choice of Forum in Federal 
Civil Tax Litigation (Part I), PRACTICAL TAX LAW., Winter 2011, at 55, 60. 
 124. Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979). 
 125. Id. at 477. 
 126. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713 
(2011) (describing the inconsistency). 
 127. Id. at 712. 
 128. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011).  
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notice and comment under the general authority of § 7805, the Court 
declared: “We see no reason why our review of tax regulations should 
not be guided by agency expertise pursuant to Chevron to the same 
extent as our review of other regulations.”129 The Court in Mayo also 
noted that “we are not inclined to carve out an approach to 
administrative review good for tax law only. To the contrary, we have 
expressly ‘[r]ecogniz[ed] the importance of maintaining a uniform 
approach to judicial review of administrative action.’”130 
That general-authority regulations receive judicial deference to 
the same extent as specific-authority regulations, however, does not 
resolve all the administrative law issues raised by the BLP regulatory 
proposal. Recall, as discussed above, that Chevron deference requires 
ambiguity in expressed congressional intent. Congressional intent 
clearly appears ambiguous under the language of §§ 501(c)(3), 4955, 
4945, 6033(e), and 162(e)(1)(B), in which the statutory language 
explicitly refers to political intervention but fails to define the term in 
any detail.131 Indeed, given the failure of Congress to provide any 
definition of the term, it is hard to imagine a court holding that 
regulations defining the term and promulgated under the general 
authority of § 7805(a) could be inconsistent with congressional intent. 
That is, counterintuitively, regulations defining political campaign 
intervention under these provisions pursuant to the general authority 
of § 7805(a) may be less vulnerable to attack than those promulgated 
under the detailed grant of regulatory authority under the BLP 
legislative proposal. 
Chevron deference also requires fidelity to congressional intent. 
When it comes to defining political campaign intervention for the 
purpose of permitting some amount of such activity by other § 501(c) 
entities, congressional intent is less clear. That is, intent may be 
lacking rather than ambiguous. As noted earlier, under the language 
of § 501(c)(4) of the I.R.C., organizations must be operated 
 
 129. Id. at 713. 
 130. Id. (quoting Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999)). 
 131. The provisions do not all use the same language, however. Section 501(c)(3) requires 
that an organization exempt under this section “not participate in, or intervene in (including the 
publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition 
to) any candidate for public office.” I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). Section 4955, which imposes an 
excise tax on the political expenditures of such organization, id. § 4955, uses the same language, 
as does § 162(e)(1)(B), which denies any business deduction for political expenditures. Id. 
§ 162(e)(1)(B). Section 6033(e) cross-references to § 162(e)(1). Id. § 6033(e). Section 4945 
imposes an excise tax on private foundations that “influence the outcome of any specific public 
election.” Id. § 4945. 
APRILL FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2014  9:08 AM 
2014] LEGISLATION VS. REGULATION 1661 
“exclusively for the promotion of social welfare.”132 It is a regulation 
promulgated in 1959, not a statute, that allows such an organization to 
be “primarily engaged in promoting in some way the common good 
and general welfare of the people of the community.”133 The 
regulations also specify that “promotion of social welfare does not 
include direct or indirect participation or intervention in political 
campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public 
office.”134 
Recently, the IRS and Treasury issued proposed regulations for 
§ 501(c)(4) organizations that would broaden the scope of what the 
proposed regulations now call “candidate-related political activity” to 
include, for example, nonpartisan voter registration and candidate 
forums.135 The proposed regulations, however, do not specify the level 
of required social welfare activity.136 The proposed regulations have 
generated enormous controversy.137 The IRS received more than 
140,000 comments on them.138 The BLP reaction, for example, in a 
fifty-six-page comment, welcomed “the IRS’s much-needed 
 
 132. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 133. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)–1(a)(2)(i) (as amended in 1990) (emphasis added). 
 134. Id. § 1.501(c)(4)–1(a)(2)(ii). 
 135. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)–1(a)(2), 78 Fed. Reg. 71,535, 71,541–42 (Nov. 29, 
2013). The proposed regulations would also define candidate-related political activity to include 
any public communication “within 30 days of a primary election or 60 days of a general election 
that refers to one or more clearly identified candidates in that election or, in the case of a 
general election, refers to one or more political parties represented in that election.” Id. at 
71,541. 
 136. The NPRM asks for comments on this question. Id. at 71,537–38. 
 137. See, e.g., Diana Aviv & Gary D. Bass, IRS Plan on Nonprofit Political Work 
Undermines Democracy, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Dec. 3, 2013), http://philanthropy.com/
article/IRS-Plan-on-Nonprofit/143351; Bob Bauer, The IRS Proposed Rules on (c)(4) Political 
Activity, MORE SOFT MONEY HARD LAW BLOG (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.moresoft
moneyhardlaw.com/2013/12/the-irs-proposed-rules-on-c4-political-activity; Ctr. for Competitive 
Politics, No Good Speech Unpunished: New Model Regulations Would Muzzle Charities’ Speech, 
CAMPAIGN FREEDOM (Dec. 6, 2013), http://www.campaignfreedom.org/2013/12/06/no-good-
speech-unpunished-new-model-regulations-would-muzzle-charities-speech; Stephanie Drahan, 
New IRS Proposal for Tax Exempt Groups “Important First Step Against Abuse” Says League, 
LEAGUE WOMEN VOTERS (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.lwv.org/press-releases/new-irs-proposal-
tax-exempt-groups-important-first-step-against-abuse-says-league; Matea Gold, New IRS Rules 
Add Both Clarity and Confusion About the Role of Advocacy Groups in Politics, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 29, 2013, 6:11 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/new-irs-rules-add-both-
clarity-and-confusion-about-the-role-of-advocacy-groups-in-politics/2013/11/28/19e76286-5784-
11e3-835d-e7173847c7cc_story.html.  
 138. See Guidance for Tax-Exempt Social Welfare Activities on Candidate-Related Political 
Activities (Reg. 134417-13), REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketBrowser;
rpp=25;so=DESC;sb=postedDate;po=0;dct=PS;D=IRS-2013-0038;refD=IRS-2013-0038-0001 
(last visited Mar. 13, 2014). 
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attention” to the issues, but concluded that the initial proposal 
required “very significant improvements in order to achieve its 
objectives, provide fair treatment of all 501(c) organizations, and 
avoid interference with legitimate, nonpartisan activities of nonprofit 
organizations.”139 It urged Treasury “to substantially rework the 
proposal and provide the public another opportunity to comment.”140 
The proposed regulations have prompted additional 
congressional scrutiny141 and have come under criticism from both the 
right and the left.142 Many have predicted that they will be 
substantially changed; others have urged their withdrawal.143 
Nonetheless, Lisa Zarlenga, Treasury Tax Legislative Counsel, has 
announced that the IRS will hold a hearing on the proposed 
regulations in the spring of 2014.144 
Some have argued, both during and prior to the recent 
controversy regarding the eligibility of Tea Party groups for 
§ 501(c)(4) status, that the IRS ignored congressional intent in 
permitting any campaign intervention by such groups.145 Thus, 
whether or not the proposed regulations defining candidate-related 
activity are finalized, it is possible that a court would find that 
§ 501(c)(4) does not permit political intervention. Under Chevron, 
congressional silence, however, is ambiguous and, as a result, the 1959 
 
 139. Comment from Gregory L. Colvin, Chair, Drafting Comm., Bright Lines Project, Lisa 
Gilbert, Director, Congress Watch and Bright Lines Project, to Amy F. Giulano, Office of the 
Assoc. Chief Counsel (Tax Exempt and Gov’t Entities), RE: Proposed Guidance for Tax-
Exempt Social Welfare Organizations on Candidate-Related Political Activities 1 (Feb. 27, 
2014), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/Bright%20Lines%20Project%20Comment
%20FINAL%20with%20exhibit.pdf.  
 140. Id. 
 141. See Fred Stokeld, At Hearing, Proposed Rules on Social Welfare Groups Described as 
Harmful to Free Speech, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 28, 2014, available at LEXIS, 2014 TNT 40-5.  
 142. See Lauren French, IRS Hit from All Political Stripes on Nonprofit Rules, POLITICO 
PRO (Mar. 3, 2014, 5:05 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/03/irs-hit-from-all-political-
stripes-on-nonprofit-rules-104146.html; Matea Gold, IRS Plan To Curb Politically Active 
Groups Is Threatened by Opposition from Both Sides, WASH. POST. POL. (Feb. 12, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/irs-plan-to-curb-politically-active-groups-threatened-
by-opposition-from-both-sides/2014/02/12/99dcfd2a-932a-11e3-b46a-5a3d0d2130da_story.html. 
 143. See French, supra note 142; Gold, supra note 142. 
 144. See Fred Stokeld, William Hoffman & David van den Berg, IRS Hearing Likely in the 
Spring on Proposed Social Welfare Group Guidance, TAX NOTES TODAY, Mar. 3, 2014, 
available at LEXIS, 2014 TNT 41-16.  
 145. Alan B. Morrison, Focusing on the Wrong IRS 501(c)(4) Scandal, HUFFINGTON POST 
(May 29, 2013, 5:02 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alan-b-morrison/irs-501c4-scandal_b_
3353468.html; Van Hollen et al. v. IRS, PUB. CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/litigation/forms/
cases/getlinkforcase.cfm?cID=838 (last visited Mar. 13, 2014).  
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regulations or any new § 501(c)(4) final regulations specifying the 
permissible levels of political campaign intervention could well be 
entitled to Chevron deference. Whether § 501(c)(4) organizations 
may engage in some or no political intervention, however, such 
groups need to know what activities do and do not amount to political 
intervention, and regulations defining political campaign intervention 
themselves would almost surely be afforded Chevron deference. 
In the case of other § 501(c) organizations, such as § 501(c)(5) 
labor organizations and § 501(c)(6) trade associations, regulations 
defining political campaign intervention would not clarify either 
statutory or other regulatory language.146 As in the case of § 501(c)(4) 
organizations, nothing in the I.R.C. refers to permission for or limits 
on political intervention.147 In the case of these organizations, 
however, the IRS has recognized their ability to engage in some 
amount of political intervention, but it has done so in guidance 
entitled to less deference than general-authority regulations 
promulgated with notice and comment. General Counsel 
Memorandum (GCM) 34233 extended to § 501(c)(5) and § 501(c)(6) 
organizations the ability to engage in some political campaign 
intervention.148 It stated that “if the primary purpose or activity of an 
organization is to engage is [sic] political action, then we believe it is 
not organized primarily as a business league and cannot qualify for 
exemption under section 501(c)(6).”149 The GCM also noted that “if 
the primary purpose and activities of an organization otherwise 
qualify it under section 501(c)(6), then participation in political 
activities will not disqualify it from exemption.”150 
 
 146. The recently proposed § 501(c)(4) regulations ask for comments about extending the 
proposed regulations to § 501(c)(5) and § 501(c)(6) organizations. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 
1.501(c)(4)–1(a)(2), 78 Fed. Reg. 71,535, 71,537 (Nov. 29, 2013). 
 147. The next several paragraphs are drawn from Aprill, supra note 8, at 381. 
 148. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,233 (Dec. 3, 1969).  
Formerly prepared by the Interpretative Division, GCMs originally were the way the 
Office of Chief Counsel communicated legal advice [in the context of private letter 
rulings and revenue rulings] to the IRS assistant commissioner (technical), which 
eventually merged into the [O]ffice of [C]hief [C]ounsel. After that point, GCMs 
became the formal legal opinion of the chief counsel responding to inquiries from a 
National Office function outside of chief counsel or explaining the legal basis for the 
position taken in a TAM, letter ruling, or revenue ruling. . . . GCMs are rarely written 
anymore except to repeal old GCMs.  
Marion Marshall, Sheryl Stratton & Christopher Bergin, The Changing Landscape of IRS 
Guidance: A Downward Slope, 90 TAX NOTES 673, 679 (2001). 
 149. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,233. 
 150. Id. See generally JOHN FRANCIS REILLY & BARBARA A. BRAIG ALLEN, POLITICAL 
CAMPAIGN AND LOBBYING ACTIVITIES OF IRC 501(C)(4), (C)(5), AND (C)(6) ORGANIZATIONS 
APRILL FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2014  9:08 AM 
1664 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:1635 
Private letter rulings, which are written statements on issues 
addressed to taxpayers who have requested the rulings, and which are 
not authority on which other taxpayers can rely,151 address § 501(c)(8) 
fraternal beneficiary societies and § 501(c)(19) veterans’ 
organizations.152 Two private letter rulings acknowledge that a 
§ 501(c)(8) organization can, without endangering its exemption, 
establish a separate segregated fund as a political action committee 
and transfer a portion of dues to it promptly and directly so that the 
transferred amounts will not be considered political campaign 
intervention subject to tax under § 527(f) by the § 501(c)(8) 
organization itself.153 By discussing the possibility of the § 501(c)(8) 
organization being subject to tax under § 527(f), the private letter 
rulings assume that the organization could engage in political 
campaign intervention directly. Neither ruling discusses how much 
political campaign intervention would be permissible for a § 501(c)(8) 
organization. 
The private ruling addressing § 501(c)(19) veterans’ 
organizations, however, does consider this issue.154 In deciding that a 
§ 501(c)(19) veterans’ association may establish a political action 
committee, the ruling, issued shortly after enactment of § 501(c)(19), 
reasoned that a § 501(c) organization can establish a separate 
 
(2003), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicl03.pdf (providing exempt 
organizations with information about the rules relating to political campaign and lobbying 
activities). 
 151. A private letter ruling (PLR)  
is a written statement issued to a taxpayer that interprets and applies tax laws to the 
taxpayer’s specific set of facts. A [PLR] is issued to establish with certainty the 
federal tax consequences of a particular transaction before the transaction is 
consummated or before the taxpayer’s return is filed. A PLR is issued in response to 
a written request submitted by a taxpayer and is binding on the IRS if the taxpayer 
fully and accurately described the proposed transaction in the request and carries out 
the transaction as described. A PLR may not be relied on as precedent by other 
taxpayers or IRS personnel. PLRs are generally made public after all information has 
been removed that could identify the taxpayer to whom it was issued.  
Understanding IRS Guidance – A Brief Primer, supra note 71. See generally IRM 32.3.2 (Oct. 25, 
2011) (providing guidance to taxpayers regarding letter rulings). Tax professionals, however, 
study private letter rulings to glean the attitude of the IRS as well as to study the reasoning and 
authorities the private letter rulings employ.  
 152. The recently proposed § 501(c)(4) regulations make no reference to and do not ask for 
comments defining political campaign intervention in the case of § 501(c)(8) or § 501(c)(19) 
organizations. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)–1(a)(2), 78 Fed. Reg. 71,535, 71,536–37 (Nov. 
29, 2013) (limiting the proposed rulemaking to § 501(c)(4) organizations). 
 153. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-52-037 (Oct. 4, 1988); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 83-42-100 (July 
20, 1983).  
 154. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 79-04-064 (Oct. 25, 1978). 
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segregated fund under § 527(f)(3) only if political campaign activity is 
consistent with its exempt purpose. Veterans’ organizations, it 
observes, are tax-exempt either under § 501(c)(4) or under the newly 
enacted § 501(c)(19). It continues: 
Concerning organizations which are tax exempt under section 
501(c)(19), the legislative history connected with the enactment of 
this section does not indicate congressional intent to either increase 
or diminish the extent that veterans organizations may be involved 
in political activities. The Code and Regulations themselves are 
silent as to the permissibility or extent of political participation or 
intervention on the part of section 501(c)(19) organizations.155 
This ruling thus suggests that § 501(c)(19) organizations can engage in 
political campaign intervention to the same extent, but not more than, 
§ 501(c)(4) organizations.156 
To date, no court has granted Chevron deference to either 
GCMs or private letter rulings,157 and there is little likelihood that, 
given their nature, any court would do so. Nonetheless, as with 
§ 501(c)(4) organizations, these other § 501(c) organizations need to 
know what activities constitute political intervention, and whether 
they are ultimately prohibited from engaging or permitted to engage 
to some extent in such activity. Thus, courts are likely to see 
congressional silence about the amount of political campaign 
intervention permitted by noncharitable § 501(c) organizations as an 
ambiguity that would result in the BLP regulatory approach receiving 
Chevron deference as applied to these entities as well. Although 
courts are not consistent regarding when they find a statute to be 
silent about a particular issue,158 the Court explicitly stated in Chevron 
that “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific 
 
 155. Id. 
 156. In contrast, Hill and Mancino believe that veterans’ organizations “may engage in 
unlimited lobbying and political activities.” See FRANCES R. HILL & DOUGLAS M. MANCINO, 
TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS ¶ 19.02[1] (2002). 
 157. See Hickman, No Man’s Land, supra note 68, at 256–57. Neither private letter rulings 
nor GCMs are published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin. Moreover, as noted above, a private 
letter ruling “may not be relied on as precedent by other taxpayers or IRS personnel.” 
Understanding IRS Guidance – A Brief Primer, supra note 71. 
 158. See Aprill, supra note 73, at 2091–94 (discussing two contrasting judicial opinions as to 
whether a statute was silent or ambiguous). 
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issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is 
based on a permissible construction of the statute.”159 
From an administrative law perspective, predicting the status of 
any revenue rulings published to clarify the BLP regulatory proposal 
becomes both challenging and intriguing. Earlier, I discussed the 
dispute as to whether revenue rulings receive Chevron or Skidmore 
deference. If, however, revenue rulings clarify Treasury regulations 
rather than statutory language, such rulings could be subject to 
Auer/Seminole Rock deference. 
Auer/Seminole Rock deference declares that an agency’s 
construction of its own regulations is to receive “controlling weight 
unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”160 A 
recent article describes the best justifications for this strong deference 
as “pragmatic”—that is, they are based on notions regarding 
“expertise, efficiency, flexibility, and accountability.”161 However, 
questions have arisen about the doctrine’s continuing validity after 
Mead and Chevron. Justice Scalia, the author of Auer, wrote recently 
in Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.162: 
For while I have in the past uncritically accepted [Auer deference], I 
have become increasingly doubtful of its validity. On the surface, it 
seems to be a natural corollary—indeed, an a fortiori application—
of the rule that we will defer to an agency’s interpretation of the 
statute it is charged with implementing. But it is not. . . . [W]hen an 
agency promulgates an imprecise rule, it leaves to itself the 
implementation of that rule, and thus the initial determination of the 
 
 159. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) 
(emphasis added). 
 160. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945); see also Auer v. 
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (applying the “deferential” Seminole Rock standard and 
finding it “easily met”); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 518 (1994) (applying 
Seminole Rock and holding that the Secretary of Health and Human Services’ interpretation 
was “faithful to the regulation’s plain language” and thus controlled). 
 161. Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1449, 1460 (2011); see also Scott H. Angstreich, Shoring Up Chevron: A Defense of 
Seminole Rock Deference to Agency Regulatory Interpretations, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 49, 89–
99 (2000) (describing the Supreme Court’s justifications for broad deference to agency 
interpretations of statutes and regulations); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and 
Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 629–31 
(1996) (discussing the rationale offered by the Supreme Court for applying Seminole Rock 
deference to agency interpretations of regulations); Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 
111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 410–12 (2012) (positing a purposive solution to “the puzzle of how a 
court is to judge when deference under Seminole Rock” is appropriate).  
 162. Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254 (2011). 
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rule’s meaning. And though the adoption of a rule is an exercise of 
the executive rather than the legislative power, a properly adopted 
rule has fully the effect of law. It seems contrary to fundamental 
principles of separation of powers to permit the person who 
promulgates a law to interpret it as well. . . .  
. . . [D]eferring to an agency’s interpretation of its own rule 
encourages the agency to enact vague rules which give it the power, 
in future adjudications, to do what it pleases. This frustrates the 
notice and predictability purposes of rulemaking, and promotes 
arbitrary government.163 
Disagreeing with Justice Scalia, the Talk America Court relied on the 
Federal Election Commission’s interpretation of the regulations at 
issue in its amicus brief, citing Auer.164 
Professors Pierce and Hickman have observed that “[t]he 
Court’s continued commitment to Seminole Rock and Auer is 
particularly interesting when one considers that Mead denies Chevron 
deference to agency interpretations of statutes expressed in the very 
guidance formats that agencies typically utilize to articulate their 
interpretations of their own regulations.”165 Moreover, the Court has 
in recent opinions emphasized situations in which it will not apply 
Auer/Seminole Rock deference. It has explained that this doctrine will 
not apply, for example, if the agency’s interpretation is “‘plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,’”166 if the agency’s 
interpretation “‘does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered 
judgment on the matter in question,’”167 if the agency’s position is 
simply a “‘convenient litigating position,’”168 or a “‘post hoc 
rationalizatio[n]’” intended “to defend past agency action against 
attack.”169 
 
 163. Id. at 2266 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted).  
 164. Id. at 2260–61. Other Supreme Court cases involving Auer/Seminole Rock deference 
include Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012); Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. 
McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871 (2011); Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (2007); 
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989); and Gardebring v. Jenkins, 
485 U.S. 415 (1988).  
 165. KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. forthcoming 2014) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 166. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2166 (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 461).  
 167. Id. (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 462) 
 168. Id. (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988)). 
 169. Id. at 2166–67 (alteration in original) (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 462). 
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Nonetheless, a recent study shows that the Supreme Court is 
extraordinarily deferential when it reviews agencies’ interpretations 
of their own rules; it upholds the agency approximately 91 percent of 
the time,170 while, according to another study, the federal district and 
circuit courts uphold the agency under Auer/Seminole Rock 
approximately 76 percent of the time.171 In contrast, Professor Steve 
Johnson has recently reviewed Tax Court cases and has concluded 
that the Tax Court has embraced Auer/Seminole Rock deference far 
less than other federal courts.172 According to Professor Johnson, 
The Tax Court typically gives at least lip-service to [Auer/Seminole 
Rock]. Sometimes it even applies [Auer/Seminole Rock] deference 
faithfully, in both cases in which the IRS prevails and cases in which 
it justifiably should not. But it is hard to escape the conclusion that, 
in the Tax Court, the [Auer/Seminole Rock] principle often is 
honored more in name than in substance.173 
He believes that the reason for the Tax Court’s reluctance is that, as a 
specialist tribunal, it is less likely to defer to the IRS than generalist 
federal courts.174 
I argue that there is a reasonable possibility that revenue rulings 
interpreting regulations (as opposed to those interpreting a statute) 
could receive Auer/Seminole Rock deference in the Tax Court as well 
as other federal courts. As Professor Johnson and I have both noted, 
 
 170. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?, 
63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 85 (2011). 
 171. Richard J. Pierce, Jr. & Joshua A. Weiss, An Empirical Study of Judicial Review of 
Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 515, 519 (2011). 
 172. See Steve R. Johnson, Auer/Seminole Rock Deference in the Tax Court, 11 
PITTSBURGH TAX REV. 1, 24–25 (2013).  
 173. Id. at 28. In addition to Lantz v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 131 (2009), rev’d on other 
grounds, 607 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2010), Professor Johnson, in his examination of recent Tax Court 
cases, discusses Judge Cohen’s concurrence in Pierre v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. 24 (2009), in 
which she stated that the case did not “adopt the litigating position of the [IRS] as distinct from 
preexistent and consistent administrative interpretations,” Johnson, supra note 172, at 23–24, as 
well as Judge Wherry’s refusal in his opinion for the court in Carpenter Family Investments v. 
Commissioner, 136 T.C. 373 (2011), to accord Seminole Rock deference to a preamble to a 
regulation, Johnson, supra note 172, at 26–27. See Carpenter Family Invs., 136 T.C. at 379 n.4. In 
2013, the Tax Court declined to grant Auer deference to the position of the IRS in a brief. See 
Rand v. Comm’r, No. 2633-11, 2013 WL 6063566, at *11 (T.C. Nov. 18, 2013).  
 174. Johnson, supra note 172, at 36–40. He also believes, however that Auer/Seminole Rock 
deference is a “dubious rule of law,” particularly because of its “pernicious incentive effects” for 
an agency to write ambiguous regulations. Id. at 40, 45–50. He finds the perverse incentive 
especially deleterious in tax matters, wherein “[v]ague regulations ‘clarified’ by explanations by 
the Treasury or the IRS make it difficult for citizens to understand and so to fulfill their 
obligation to pay taxes they legally owe.” Id. at 51. 
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the Tax Court resisted adopting Chevron. It did so for largely the 
same reason—its belief in its own expertise—that Professor Johnson 
suggests for the Tax Court’s unwillingness to apply Auer/Seminole 
Rock deference.175 Eventually, however, the Tax Court did in fact 
accept the application of Chevron deference.176 It may do the same 
with Auer/Seminole Rock deference. In addition, since Mayo, both 
private practitioners and government lawyers have become more 
sensitive to administrative law issues.177 In particular, William J. 
Wilkins, the Chief Counsel of the IRS, has stated that he was 
interested in seeing whether a case “would prompt a court to consider 
the potential application[s] of Auer v. Robbins” to a tax case.178 
Therefore, government lawyers at some future time could well make 
the argument that revenue rulings interpreting regulations should 
receive Auer/Seminole Rock deference. 
As discussed above, the Supreme Court in Talk America recently 
gave Auer/Seminole Rock deference to positions in briefs, including 
an amicus brief. Nonetheless, the form of agency interpretations that 
are entitled to Auer/Seminole Rock deference is a matter of 
considerable controversy. As Professor Matthew Stephenson and 
attorney Miri Pogoriler have explained, cases have afforded 
Auer/Seminole Rock deference to an interpretation contained in no 
more than an internal memorandum and agency practice or in an 
inter-agency memorandum.179 Nonetheless, they conclude that strong 
Auer/Seminole Rock deference should be reserved for 
“interpretations issued in orders following formal adjudications, while 
granting only Skidmore respect to interpretive rules and informal 
order.”180 
 
 175. Id. at 39–40; see Aprill, supra note 123, at 67–73. 
 176. Johnson, supra note 172, at 39. 
 177. See Patrick J. Smith, Life After Mayo: Silver Linings, 131 TAX NOTES 1251, 1254 (2011) 
(describing the “tax community’s overreaction to Mayo”). 
 178. Jeremiah Coder & Shamik Trivedi, Supreme Court Has Put Regulatory Challenges in 
Play, Wilkins Says, 138 TAX NOTES 1212 (2013).  
 179. See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 161, at 1484–85 & nn.147–48 (collecting cases). 
 180. Id. at 1496. They suggest that the strong deference of Auer/Seminole Rock is 
appropriate only “in orders following formal adjudications, which entail extensive hearing and 
participation rights as well as significant constraints on the agency’s decisionmaking process.” 
Id. at 1485–86. They are unwilling to look to the seniority of the official approving an 
interpretation as a key factor because, they believe, “[a]n interpretive question significant 
enough to attract the attention of a senior agency official prior to litigation is more likely to be a 
question that is sufficiently prominent that the agency could and should address it through a 
legislative rule.” Id. at 1492. I do not believe this generality holds for tax. 
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Lantz v. Commissioner,181 a Tax Court case that involved possible 
discretionary relief by the IRS to a statute of limitations, also 
demonstrates the dispute about the reach of Auer/Seminole Rock 
deference. The majority of the Tax Court relied on Bowles v. 
Seminole Rock & Sand Co.182 in concluding that this special relief did 
not apply. In dissent, Judge Halpern argued that the IRS position was 
“no more than a litigating position,” and one “without merit, or, in 
the language of Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., ‘plainly 
erroneous’ and ‘inconsistent with the regulation,’ which would cause 
its rejection in any event.”183 But Judge Halpern also suggested that 
such deference might be available when the IRS position takes the 
form of published guidance.184 Such would be the case for revenue 
rulings interpreting regulations. That is, if Judge Halpern’s view 
eventually prevails in the Tax Court, revenue rulings interpreting 
regulations could well receive Auer/Seminole Rock deference. 
In sum, the BLP regulatory proposal offers two distinct 
advantages from the government’s point of view. It reduces the 
possibility that regulations could be deemed inconsistent with 
congressional intent and allows the possibility that revenue rulings 
interpreting the political campaign intervention rules would be 
afforded the strong deference of Auer/Seminole Rock. 
CONCLUSION 
We would expect that the surest and strongest way to ensure 
establishment of rules defining political campaign intervention for 
purposes of the federal tax law would be to enshrine the rules in the 
I.R.C. However, because of a number of administrative law 
doctrines—in particular the difference between the two steps of 
Chevron, the holding of Mayo regarding deference to general-
authority regulations, and the possible application of Auer/Seminole 
Rock deference to revenue rulings interpreting regulations, but not to 
those interpreting statutes—the BLP regulatory proposal, not the 
legislative proposal, offers those who have drafted the BLP proposals 
and the government a greater ability to establish and clarify the 
 
 181. Lantz v. Comm’r, 132 T.C. 131 (2009), rev’d on other grounds, 607 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 
2010).  
 182. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945).  
 183. Lantz, 132 T.C. at 151 (Halpern, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Seminole 
Rock, 325 U.S. at 414). 
 184. See id.  
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definition of political campaign intervention under the federal tax 
law. 
The contrast discussed in this Article, however, involves only two 
possibilities: first, a relatively detailed statutory regime followed by 
guidance in the form of revenue rulings, and second, sparse or silent 
statutory direction followed first by regulations and then by revenue 
rulings. Neither of these alternatives is desirable. Far preferable, both 
in the case of political campaign intervention in particular and for tax 
legislation in general, would be a process involving both Congress and 
the tax agencies. 
Congressional action, of course, represents the promise of 
representative and responsive government. Having Congress enact 
statutes ensures the most direct accountability to the electorate and 
the perceived legitimacy of the rules enacted. One scholar has 
articulated a particular need for congressional action in the case of 
tax laws: 
Taxing powers are, as a matter of history and practice, different 
from other sorts of government authority. When government 
commands that a citizen surrender money or property, it is essential 
that the decision reflect a modicum of democratic accountability. 
Democratically elected—and accountable—members of Congress, 
rather than bureaucrats, should be required to endorse de facto 
revenue measures and face the potential wrath of the voters if they 
deem the taxes too burdensome or the program’s benefits too 
ephemeral.185 
Of course, congressional delegation is important for major policy 
decisions in general. Recently, in Loving v. IRS,186 the Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that Treasury regulations 
applicable to tax-return preparers were invalid under Chevron Step 
One, which requires that an agency give effect to the clear intent of 
Congress, as inconsistent with the text, history, structure, and context 
of the applicable statute. Loving relied on FDA v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp.,187 which denied the Food and Drug 
Administration authority to regulate tobacco products,188 to assert 
 
 185. Ronald J. Krotosynski, Jr., Reconsidering the Nondelegation Doctrine: Universal 
Service, the Power To Tax, and the Ratification Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 239, 246 (2005). 
 186. Loving v. IRS, No. 13-5061, 2014 WL 519224 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 11, 2014). 
 187. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
 188. Id. at 161. 
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that courts should not presume congressional intent to “implicitly 
delegate decisions of major economic or political significance.”189 
In the case of political campaign intervention by tax-exempt 
organizations, Congress has done more than make an implicit 
delegation. Congress has assigned responsibility for interpreting and 
administering § 501(c)(4) and other provisions of § 501(c) to the IRS 
and Treasury by establishing these categories in the I.R.C. 
Nonetheless, it is possible that regulation of this activity has itself 
grown so politically fraught that it will prove difficult for Treasury 
and the IRS to draft regulations that will garner public acceptance,190 
including not only the proposed regulations, but also the regulations 
suggested by the BLP, given the thinness of the statutory base on 
which the regulations must be built. 
Thus, if our sharply divided Congress could agree on some 
approach,191 some additional congressional direction as to the 
meaning of political campaign intervention by exempt organizations 
would be desirable. At the same time, too detailed a set of statutory 
provisions poses a danger. Such statutes risk ossification. Exhaustive, 
finely articulated statutory provisions hamper administrative agencies 
in responding to changing circumstances.192 Statutes with more 
general guidance—that is, statutes that do not attempt to address all 
possibilities, both present and future, followed by careful regulations 
with notice and comment, and then by revenue rulings that receive 
appropriate Auer/Seminole Rock deference offers a better model, if 
only as an ideal. 
 
 189. Loving, 2014 WL 519224, at *8. 
 190. For example, the House has voted to delay for one year the finalization of the proposed 
§ 501(c)(4) regulations. See Stokeld, supra note 141. 
 191. See generally, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, the 
Supreme Court, and Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205 (2013); Justin Levitt, The Partisanship 
Spectrum, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2239491; Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes 
of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273 (2011).  
 192.  See Kyle D. Logue & James R. Hines, Jr., Delegating Tax 10 (Univ. of Mich. Pub. Law 
Research Paper No. 391, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2402047 (“Even when the legislative process is working well, it may take longer for Congress to 
pass a new law than it takes an agency to make a new rule.”) These authors disagree with 
Krotosynski, supra note 185, to argue “that Congress should consider making more extensive 
delegations of authority in the tax area—or, at the very least, that Congress should think more 
expansively about what types of tax lawmaking power it is prepared to delegate.” Logue & 
Hines, supra, at 4. 
